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The Martinet and the Mob
Federal Authority and Local Control
of the First Iowa Volunteer Cavalry
in the Civil War
DAVID CROSSON
I N 1987 several Iowa state legislators attempted to persuade
Governor Terry E. Branstad to prevent state-controlled, volun-
teer Iowa National Guard units from serving a training mission
in Nicaragua. Some governors, such as Michael Dukakis of Mas-
sachusetts, did keep their state troops home. To some degree
these actions reflected public disagreements over national for-
eign policy in Central America. But in other ways these recent ef-
forts by state officials to control their own volunteer troops are
nothing more than a restatement of the continuing American di-
alogue over the nature of our federal system.^ Not surprisingly,
the parameters of the discussion were defined during the Civil
War, when northern states like Iowa, as well as their southern
brethren, struggled to define the nature of the proper relation-
ship between state and federal authority.
Allan Nevins has argued forcefully that the most important
single result of the American Civil War was the creation of an or-
ganized society out of an unorganized society. The fratricidal
struggle centralized and systematized the national economy,
culture, and governmental structure. A modicum of authority,
control, and predictability for the first time replaced the auton-
omy, disunity, and chance of the antebellum years. The process
of superimposing order over previous disorder was not complete
in 1865, Nevins concluded, but it was well under way, and the
outlines of the new system were evident. ^
1. Des Moines Register, 5, 19 Feb., 23 May 1987.
2. Allan Nevins, "A Major Result of the Civil War," Civil War History 5
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This new acceptance of a broad general authority above and
beyond the individual and the most local of goverrunental institu-
tions was an event of paramount significance in the evolution of
the American federal system. The individualistic American peo-
ple had surrendered precious little authority to the national gov-
ernment before the Civil War. Ultimate authority still rested with
the individual, who was usually quite chary about sharing it with
contrived governmental organizations. The more removed the
governmental unit from the individual, the more reluctant was
the individual to accept its authority. Thus, when different levels
of government struggled among themselves, as they often did,
the most local units usually won out.
In no area was local—and particularly state—control more
real and national centralization more mandatory in 1861 than in
'me organization and command of the army. Decentralization re-
flected both the condition of the regular army in 1861 and the
manner in which the necessary new volunteer troops were
raised and organized. However, a national military force respon-
sible to federal authority was absolutely essential to sustain a
military effort the size of which the world had never before
seen.3 Yet the method in which these troops were recruited and
organized admitted the supremacy of state governments over
federal authority and maximized the possibility of conflict over
control of troops thus raised. Indeed, at the end of the war (and
beyond) the volunteer army remained in some respects the
strongest bastion of local authority against the organizing and
nationalizing effects that Nevins analyzed so well.
Since it was psychologically impossible for the American
people in 1861 to accept a general conscription, the only alterna-
tive for raising the necessary troops was a call for volunteers.
According to procedures eventually standardized, each state
was alone responsible for clothing, feeding, transporting, and (if
necessary) arming all volunteers joining regiments within its
borders until they were officially mustered into federal service.
(1959), 237-50; Allan Nevins, The War for the Union, 5 vols. (New York, 1959-
71), 5: 395.
3. There were only 16,367 men in the regular army of the United States
in April 1861. Many of these men soon left to join the Confederacy. See E. B.
Long, The Civil War Day by Day (New York, 1971), 702, 707.
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Because men from one state could volunteer for regiments being
formed in another, there was potential for interstate contests
over volunteers. And since colonels were appointed by gover-
nors, the men who commanded the regiments often owed alle-
giance more to state politicians than to their commanders in the
field. Even promotion to the rank of general, which had to be
recommended by the president and approved by the United
States Senate, was to a large degree determined by state quotas.
Finally, regiments, the primary fighting units of the Civil War,
belonged to the states.^
Although Iowa is not necessarily representative of the
other eighteen northern states, the prairie commonwealth can
serve as a convenient tool for examining the struggle between
state and national authorities over the control and care of state
troops in federal service. The history of one Iowa regiment in
particular, the First Iowa Volunteer Cavalry, graphically dem-
onstrates the struggle for authority over volunteer troops. The
First Iowa Volunteer Cavalry entered service amid controversy
and left in controversy; and state officials stood by it all the
way, as if they were in the field alongside the troops. The regi-
ment's assignment in June 1865 to the command of one of the
most colorful and controversial figures in American history.
Major General (of volunteers) George Armstrong Custer, adds
additional intrigue to the story.
As might be expected, evaluations of the regiment's service
under Custer vary dramatically. According to the official Rosier
and Record of the First Iowa Cavalry,
General Custer was a brave and dashing cavalry officer who had
been trained in a severe school of discipline and was utterly
unfit for command of volunteers. . . . He lacked the essential
qualifications—kindness of heart, tact, and good judgment of
human nature—which would have enabled him to enforce a
proper degree of discipline, and, at the same time, have secured
the respect and attachment instead of the cordial hatred of the
men under his command.
4. Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union
Army, 1861-1865,2 vols. (Cleveland, 1928), esp. 1:15-51,295-323; Long, Day
by Day, 716-18.
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"It is altogether to the credit of the men and officers of the First
Iowa Cavalry," the Record continues, "that they were able to sub-
mit to the cruel indignities to which they were subjected while
under the command of General Custer, instead of being driven
to open insubordination."^
A recent scholar disagrees with this virtuous view of
Hawkeye manhood and supports the general, whose measures,
he says, "were made necessary because of disciplinary prob-
lems." John M. Carroll argues that the boy-general responded to,
but did not cause, "rebellion" in the ranks. Complaints against
the commander, he insists, were "petty" and personal. Carroll is
convinced that most of Custer's detractors have "confused 'cru-
elty' with 'necessary discipline.'" Unfortunately, while calling
for an objective evaluation of the situation, Carroll immediately
admits, "I am pro-Custer—very much so." This is hardly the
man from whom an objective opinion can be expected.*
Just as unfortunate, the author is so concerned with
Custer's defense that he misses the real issue in dispute, the ina-
bility of the duly appointed military representatives of the fed-
eral government to achieve a general, nonpersonal recognition
and acceptance of federal authority over volunteer troops.
Carroll maintains that two men, surgeon Charles Lothrop and
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander McQueen, allowed "their own
specious arguments to appear to be the official voice of their reg-
iment and state." The significant point is that "they did not hesi-
tate to involve Iowa State officials and home newspapers" in
their support. This w^ as nothing new. It was the way volunteer
regiments had responded to real and imagined threats and
abuses throughout the war.^
Thus, an examination of the service of the First Iowa Cav-
alry offers an opportunity to explore two separate issues. First,
and most important, what was the nature of the struggle be-
5. Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers in the War of the Rebellion Together
with Historical Sketches of Volunteer Organization 1861-66,6 vols. (Des Moines,
1910), 4: 15-16.
6. John M. Carroll, Custer in Texas: An Interrupted Narrative (New York,
1975), xi-xvi. See also John M. Carroll, Custer's Cavalry Occupation of
Hempstead and Austin, Texas and The History of Custer's Headquarters Building
(Glendale, CA, 1983); Steven Land Tillotson, Remnant of an Era: The History of
the Little Campus Site (1859-1977) (Austin, TX, 1977).
7. Carroll, Custer in Texas, xv.
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tween state and federal authorities over the control of volunteer
troops mustered into federal service during the Civil War? Sec-
ond, of less historical significance, but of considerable interest to
students of one of the great legends of the American West, what
was the nature of the relationship between General George
Armstrong Custer and the troops under his command in Louisi-
ana and Texas in 1865 and 1866?
T H E FIRST IOWA VOLUNTEER CAVALRY organized under
President Lincoln's call for troops of May 3,1861. Appointment
of the mercurial Fitz Henry Warren as the regiment's command-
ing officer and a dispute over regimental pay provided early evi-
dence of the pattern of political meddling in military affairs that
characterized volunteer units in the Civil War.
Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood appointed Fitz Henry War-
ren of Burlington as colonel of the First Iowa Cavalry not to re-
ward a political friend but to isolate a dangerous competitor. An
old-line Whig, former editor of the Burlington Hawk-Eye, and
one of the founders of Iowa's Republican party. Warren was not
unknown in national political circles. He had served as the first
Civil War correspondent for Horace Greeley's powerful New
York Tribune. After working diligently for Lincoln's election, the
erratic politico felt slighted when he was not appointed to a cabi-
net position. Blaming Kirkwood and the governor's political
godfather. Senator James W. Grimes, for thwarting his ambi-
tions. Warren made it clear that he planned to challenge the
first-term governor for their party's nomination in 1861. By ten-
dering Warren a colonel's appointment, Kirkwood strategically
forced his opponent to choose between accepting a military ap-
pointment, which would remove him from the gubernatorial
race, and refusing the commission, which would appear unpa-
triotic and remove any chance of electoral success. It was a
shrewd political move that graphically demonstrated the
unmilitary purposes to which military commissions were put.^
8. Fitz Henry Warren to Hawkins Taylor, 2 Jan. 1861, Samuel J. Kirkwood
to Abraham Lincoln, 7 Jan. 1861, James Harlan to Lincoln, 17 Jan. 1861,
Lincoln Papers (microfilm). Library of Congress, Washington, DC; A. T. Shaw
to Kirkwood, Apr. 1861, Kirkwood Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa,
Des Moines; William Merritt to William Penn Clarke, 15 Sept. 1861, William
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On June 19, 1861, Secretary of War Simon Cameron ac-
cepted Governor Kirkwood's offer of a regiment of mounted
cavalry, "the first volunteer cavalry organization, which had en-
listed for a three year term of service, to be accepted by the gov-
ernment." The governor ordered the regiment to rendezvous in
Burlington on July 18, and it was mustered into federal service
on August 17, two months after it had been officially accepted.^
When the regiment was paid for the first time in November, Col-
onel Warren claimed pay from the time the regiment was first ac-
cepted, June 19. The government first paid the regiment, then
decided to withhold two months' pay from future regimental
issue, and finally charged the colonel with fraud. The govern-
ment ultimately maintained that the regiment should have been
paid only from the date of muster, not from the date of accept-
ance two months earlier. The impetuous colonel, who was al-
lowed to keep his salary for the earlier period, advanced on
Washington with all the political ammunition he could muster
on behalf of his troops. How, he asked, could a colonel "be paid
in the Volunteer service when he has no Regiment?" "And how,
when a Col. has been adjudged as entitled to his pay, [can] the
subordinate officers and enlisted men . . . be denied theirs?" A
sixteen-page judge advocate general's report delivered directly
to President Lincoln in April 1863 concluded that the regula-
tions were uncertain when the First Iowa Cavalry was recruited,
and the confusion of conflicting regulations allowed different
interpretations of the date at which federal responsibility began.
The report completely exonerated the colonel, but the regiment
was never paid. The Iowa General Assembly petitioned Con-
gress annually for redress with no effect. When Warren returned
to Washington in 1867, he still could not acquire the pay that he
Penn Clarke Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines; lames W.
Grimes to Kirkwood, 9 Ian. 1861, "Letters of lames W. Grimes," Anna/s of Iowa
22 (1941), 567; Henry W. Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel}. Kirkwood
(Iowa City, 1893), 142. For Warren's career with the New York Tribune, see
Louis M. Starr, Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Newsman in Action (New York,
1954), 33-37, 53-55.
9. Simon Cameron to Kirkwood, 19Iune lS61,inThe War of the Rebellion:
A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, ser. 3,
vol. 1, p. 279; Roster and Record, 3; Charles W. Lothrop, History of the 1st Regi-
ment, Iowa Cavalry (Lyons, IA, 1890), 18-30.
644
The Martinet and the Mob
believed had been inappropriately expropriated from his regi-
ment six years earlier. ^ °
FINALLY, the First Iowa Cavalry went to war. In October 1861,
the regiment removed to Benton Barracks, St. Louis, and it stum-
bled through its first engagement at Blackwater on December
19. Most of 1861 and 1862 were spent chasing small, mobile
bands of independent Confederates in central and southern
Missouri. The regiment joined the expedition into Arkansas in
1862 and participated in engagements at Van Buren, Bayou
Meto, and Little Rock. It also claimed Princeton, Elkin's Ferry,
Camden Crossroads, and Saline River on its battle flag. More
military activity occurred in Missouri during the Civil War than
in any other state, except Virginia and Tennessee. Arkansas
ranks fifth. In four years of marching across Missouri and Ar-
kansas, the First Iowa Cavalry gathered more dust than glory;
but it was certainly busy, and it remained proud, ably com-
manded, and defensive of its record and honor."
Ultimately, the Iowans left Arkansas on February 12, 1865,
for Tennessee, where the troops anticipated operations against
Nathan Bedford Forrest's mounted guerrillas. Just as they found
themselves in a position to acquire the national reputation that
they knew they deserved, the war ended. Unfortunately, the end
of the war did not mean the end of service for the First Iowa Cav-
alry. Instead of being mustered home, the Hawkeye horsemen
were ordered to join the Twelfth and Fifth Illinois, Second Wis-
consin, and Seventh Indiana cavalries at Alexandria, Louisiana,
to create the Second Cavalry Division, Department of Texas, Di-
vision of the Gulf. The weary regiment was not finally mustered
out of service until February 1866.^ ^
10. Report by Fitz Henry Warren, 20 Nov. 1867, and Report of J. Holt,
Judge Advocate General to Lincoln, 28 Apr. 1863, both in Governor's Office,
ser. 8, vol. 39, State Archives, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines;
Lincoln to Edwin M. Stanton, 14 Feb. 1863, in Roy P. Basier, ed.. The Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, 1953), 6:106.
11. The Union Army, 8 vols. (Madison, WI, 1908), 177-79; Long, Day by
Day, 719; Adjutant General's Report, 1863, 2 vols. (Des Moines, 1863), 2: 845-
50; Adjutant General's Report, 1867, 2 vols. (Des Moines, 1867), 2: 507-13;
Lothrop, History.
12. Adjutant General's Report, 1867, 2: 513-14; Raphael P. Thain, comp..
Notes Illustrating the Military Geography of the United States (Washington, DC,
1881), 13, 20.
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There were three reasons for maintaining a military pres-
ence in the South after the Civil War. Only two related directly to
the conflict itself. Military vigilance over the conquered nation
was required to prevent isolated instances of continued intransi-
gence from swelling into renewed armed resistance. There was
also a very real need to enforce order where all civil authority
had been destroyed. Perhaps as important and certainly as im-
mediate, the federal government was profoundly concerned
over the unstable situation in Mexico. There was a general ex-
pectation that the United States might sooner or later employ
military force to prevent a European country from reestablish-
ing a colonial stronghold in the New World. The Second Cavalry
Division, which included the Iowa unit, was to outfit and orga-
nize in Alexandria and move into Texas to quell any local distur-
bances, maintain general order in the absence of civil authority,
and be prepared for intervention across the Rio Grande."
Conflict emerged from an unexpected source, however, not
from Mexico or from Confederate diehards. After four years of
military activity during the Civil War, the First Iowa Cavalry ex-
perienced its most bitter and humiliating reverse during nine
months of service in Louisiana and Texas. And the humiliation
was inflicted not by the enemy but by the division com-
mander—flaxen-haired, twenty-six-year-old Major Ceneral
Ceorge Armstrong Custer.
I N THE SUMMER O F 1865 the First Iowa Cavalry and several
other regiments were assigned to the command of General
Custer at Alexandria, Louisiana, "a confused mass of ruins" cre-
ated by the war. With him they marched to Hempstead, Texas,
and then to Austin, where they were finally mustered out. In
Texas, small "detachments of troops were stationed for a few
weeks at a time at different county seats" from the Indian Nation
to the
13. General Sheridan to Edwin M. Stanton, 14 Nov. 1866, quoted in
Carroll, Ouster's Cavalry, 5-12.
14. "Autobiography of Col. William Thompson," 1, State Historical Soci-
ety of Iowa, Des Moines; Carroll, Custer in Texas. Supporting Carroll's conten-
tion are Elizabeth B. Custer, Tenting on the Plains (New York, 1887); Margue-
rite Merington, ed.. The Custer Story: The Life and Intimate Letters of General
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During these nine months a few individuals complained re-
peatedly to anyone who would listen about marching condi-
tions, the lack of adequate food and medical supplies, and the
ruthless manner in which the commanding general adminis-
tered discipline. Although much of this was no more than usual
volunteer complaints against the normal conditions of military
life, accentuated by the understandable desire to return home,
unrest focused on Special Order No. 2. Issued the day after Iowa
troops arrived in Alexandria, the order demanded summary
punishment by the lash and/or head shaving, without access to
trial by court-martial, of anyone accused of foraging without per-
mission. Specifically, Custer's order commanded:
No foraging parties will be sent out from this command with-
out written permission from the headquarters, and then only to
obtain fresh beef and grain, for which payment will be made.. . .
Every violation of this order will receive prompt and severe
punishment. Owing to the delays of Courts Martial and their im-
practicality when the command is unsettled, it is hereby ordered
that any enlisted man violating the above order or committing
deprivations upon the persons or property of citizens, will have
his head shaved, and in addition, will receive twenty-five lashes
upon his back, well laid on.'^
The order was signed on June 24, 1865. The general did not
bother to appoint a court-martial until July, although the order
was enforced in the interim. When the court was finally ap-
pointed, Iowa's Lieutenant Colonel Alexander McQueen pre-
sided. ^ ^
George A. Custer and His Wife Elizabeth (New York, 1950), 172-74; and Jay
Monaghan, Custer: The Life of General George Armstrong Custer (Toronto,
1959), 256-65. The volunteer's point of view is reflected in Lothrop, History,
216-99; Thomas S. Cogley, History of the Seventh Indiana Cavalry Volunteers
(La Porte, IN, 1-876); and Emmett C. West, History and Reminiscences of the Sec-
ond Cavalry Regiment (Portage, WI, 1904).
15. The many general complaints are recorded in the Governor's Office,
ser. 2, vol. 17, State Archives; Adjutant General's Office, sen 3, vol. 27, State
Archives. Special Order No. 2, 24 June 1865, can be found in the Charles
Lothrop Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, reprinted in Adju-
tant General's Report, 1867, 2: 514.
16. A. G. McQueen to Kirkwood, 19 Jan. 1867, Kirkwood Papers.
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On September 14, General Custer ordered the arrest and
punishment of two men for violating Special Order No. 2. One
of the men was Private Horace M. Cure of the First Iowa's "A"
Company. Cure was the only Iowa soldier to suffer the humilia-
tion of head shaving and the pain of flogging under Custer. It is
significant that on the very same day that Cure was punished.
General Custer officially exonerated the First Iowa Cavalry and
the Second Brigade, of which it was part, of any responsibility
for or participation in the incident for which Private Cure suf-
fered. The general even congratulated the First Iowa's "Officers
and men" for being "so strictly honest and upright."^^
Cure's punishment did not remain long unnoticed back
home. Iowa Governor William Milo Stone had already sent a
curt letter to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton demanding that
the regiment's "brutal, degrading, and unmilitary treatment
from Gen. Custer . . . be searchingly investigated immediately,
and the regiment mustered out."^^ After the flogging incident,
home pressure mounted. Adjutant General Nathanial Baker
wired Stanton, "Has Geni Custer now in Texas under the arti-
cles of war and the acts of Congress any right with or without
court martial of offender to order' or inflict punishment of a
number of the 1 Iowa Cav by shaving of head & infliction of
lashes? If he has such right or authority, from what source does
he derive it?"^ ^ The implication was clear. The Iowa adjutant
general was not about to allow the federal government the right
or authority to punish Iowa troops, the fact that they were mus-
tered into federal service notwithstanding. Baker's telegram re-
ceived no reply, perhaps because federal officials had, by late
1865, become weary of receiving such hyperbole from the west-
ern prairie. On October 18 Governor Stone again demanded
Stanton's attention and justified his interference in the matter.
"In the conduct of the General named, the violations of law and
regulations have been so palpable, and his treatment of these
17. General Order No. 5,14 Sept. 1865, Regimental Order Book, 1st Iowa
Cavalry, RG94, 2d sec, p. 57, National Archives, Washington, DC; Henry L.
Morrill to Kirkwood, 23 Jan. 1867, and McQueen to Kirkwood, 17 Jan. 1867,
Kirkwood Papers.
18. William Milo Stone to Stanton, 2 Oct. 1865, Governor's Office, ser. 2,
vol. 17, p. 315, State Archives.
19. N. B. Baker to Stanton, 7 Oct. 1865, Adjutant General's Office, ser. 3,
vol. 27, p. 126, State Archives.
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men so brutal, that forbearance on my part would amount to
criminal neglect of duty.'^"
Iowa troops were not the only ones to suffer and chafe
under the enforcement of Special Order No. 2. According to the
official historian of the Seventh Indiana Cavalry, "The regiment,
on its arrival at Hempstead, was almost destitute of clothing,
and was nearly starving." When word reached camp that some
other soldiers had killed a beef, "some men from the 7th Indiana
. . . went out to get the refuse meat," only to find the carcass
already well-gleaned. "Greatly disappointed" and "nearly
starved," three men from Company I "killed a runty calf worth
about one dollar and brought some of the meat into camp."
"Anxious for the opportunity to exercise cruelty," Custer ordered
his provost marshall, "a brute perfectly willing to do his dirty
work, to go through the farce" of examining the accused. Two
men confessed and were sentenced to head shaving and forty
lashes. According to the Indiana regiment's historian, Thomas
S. Cogley, "This outrage won for Custer the lasting hatred of
every decent man in his command."^^
The strict administration of Special Order No. 2 may have
been the most extreme complaint, but it by no means stood
alone as the only source of discontent in the Second Cavalry Di-
vision. Most of the volunteers were not prepared for the general
degree of rigid discipline demanded by "this martinet of the Reg-
ular Army." The citizen soldiers especially did not appreciate
such draconian measures when the military conflict was over.
Custer's concern that "regimental and stable guards have been
slovenly doing duty," for instance, appeared rather minor when
there was no danger of armed attack. The requirement that
"Regimental Officers of the Day will specify the Company and
Commander whose camp & horse exhibit most care," was punc-
tilious. And "allowing" men to "bathe in river before 8 AM and
after 5 PM" seemed just plain silly. Who was going to bathe in a
river where the favorite pastime was "catching alligators?"^^
20. Stone to Stanton, 18 Oct. 1865, Governor's Office, ser. 2, vol. 17, pp.
346-48, State Archives.
21. Cogley, Indiana, 176-77.
22. Roster and Record, 4:15; Circular #34, 7 Sept. 1865, Order Book, 1st
Iowa Cavalry, RG94, 3d sec, p. 25, National Archives; General Order No. 2,
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In some cases, the complaints themselves were indeed petty
or personal. "Everything about him indicated the fop and
dandy," wrote Cogley. "Everything in the regulations that was
gaudy, and tended only to excite vanity, he caused to be scrupu-
lously observed." Iowa's Henry L. Morrill noted that Custer
brought with him to Alexandria ten staff officers, "a squadron
acting as Provost Guard—a small Brigade of orderlies—and
only five aide-de-camps." The presence of Custer's wife
Elizabeth was also bothersome, and the men grumbled about
performing "menial services for her." They also objected to "de-
tached duty" as trainers and stablemen for Custer's race horses
in Austin.^3
Most persistent, however, were the complaints about the
quantity and quality of food, clothing, and medical supplies.
"We never suffered so much for want of proper and sufficient ra-
tions," wrote one former soldier to Senator Kirkwood in 1867,
"as while under General Custer's command." When Iowa Pri-
vate James Fodge finally received his pay in Hempstead, he
wrote to his mother that he would keep twenty dollars "to buy
grub with" because "we live so hard." Later, the same soldier
wrote from Austin that he would have gone to a Sunday night
"meeting," but "I am the raggedest boy you ever saw in your life
and as there is several texas Ladys comes to meeting I cannot go."
"We have not drawn any clothing in four months," he com-
plained, "and there is no signs of drawing soon."^*
Some men were wise enough to understand that the
responsibility for problems in supply belonged to the quarter-
master and commissary departments, not to the general in com-
mand. But even they could not understand why, if the commis-
sary could not meet their needs, they were not allowed to forage
on their own. After all, Texas had been very Confederate, and
psychologically still was. In some places, one soldier com-
22 July 1865, Lothrop Papers; Circular, 23 June 1865, Order Book, 1st Iowa
Cavalry, RG94, 2d sec, p. 16, National Archives; Cogley, Indiana, 168.
23. Cogley, Indiana, 176; Morrill to Kirkwood, 23 Jan. 1867, Kirkwood
Papers.
24. Cogley, Indiana, 176; Morrill to Kirkwood, 23 Jan. 1867, Kirkwood
Papers; James M. Lodge to Mother, 27 Aug., 6 Oct., 10 Dec. 1865, Lodge Col-
lection, Western History Research Center, University of Wyoming.
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plained, the women "won't let us get water without a
Iowa's Lieutenant Colonel McQueen spent a good deal of
his time locating food and medical supplies. He finally bypassed
the quartermaster's office and traveled to Matagorda, Mexico, to
negotiate directly the purchase of two hundred head of "fresh
beef for the men at 7V2 cents per pound, or about fifteen dollars
per head. McQueen also ordered his staff medical director to
"see if the 3 months supply of medicines have been sent & try &
have him get 25 or 30 oz. of quinine additive to the requisition."
The requisition apparently left Galveston but did not arrive in
Hempstead. "Have not heard from it since," recorded McQueen,
"and we are out of almost every thing and quinine especially."
This was particularly significant when, as one soldier later wrote
home from Austin, "We have a good deal of sickness here." ^^
Custer, too, in fairness, did identify the problem, and made
an effort to remedy it. On September 10 he convened a bo.:/ d of
investigation "to inquire into the frauds perpetrated upon the
enlisted men of the Command . . . by issuing them rations defi-
cient in quantity and worthless in quality at a time when no ap-
parent reason existed unless it be the incompetency of officers of
the Commissary Depart." Apparently no action resulted from
the investigation, however, for the problem still prevailed at
least as late as December.^''
In sum, the accusations against General Custer included
(1) illegal, inappropriate, and inflammatory discipline brutally
enforced; (2) failure to secure adequate food, clothing, and med-
ical supplies; and (3) a haughty manner and imperial way of liv-
ing that did not become a military man, at least not one com-
manding volunteer troops. To these a fourth might be added—a
general accusation that Custer did not understand the citizen
soldier. Cogley concluded that the West Point general "had no
sympathy in common with the private soldiers, but regarded
them simply as machines." Iowa's Colonel William Thompson,
25. Thompson, "Autobiography," 65-66; Lodge to Mother, 27 Aug. 1865,
Lodge Collection.
26. Alexander McQueen diary, 28 Dec. 1865, in private possession of Ms.
Kris Smith, formerly of Conroe, Texas; Lodge to Mother, 6 Nov. 1865, n.d.
1865, Lodge Collection.
27. Special Order No. 48, 10 Sept. 1865, Order Book, 1st Iowa Cavalry,
RG94, 3d sec, p. 64, National Archives.
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on the other hand, thought that "General Custer was an edu-
cated soldier.. ., but he let this Provost Marshall of his, hinder
and obscure all of his native kindness and benevolence."^^
A S S E S S I N G FAIRLY the treatment of troops under Custer in
Louisiana and Texas is no easy task. Custer himself, of course,
eludes dispassionate evaluation no less today than while he was
alive. Already by 1865, few people who knew George Arm-
strong Custer were neutral about him. In addition, the reports
from soldiers in the field and the memories of veterans at home
were obviously self-serving, intended to defend the perfor-
mance of noble citizen soldiers who had been unjustly wronged.
The situation is further complicated by a lack of important docu-
mentary evidence. Documents are missing or, perhaps, as
Carroll suggests, were never really there. With all of the pitfalls,
however, it is still possible to make a historical judgment. In the
end that judgment favors the volunteer troops over their com-
manding general.
On October 25, 1865, in apparent response to a telegram
from Iowa Governor William Milo Stone to Secretary of War
Stanton, George Armstrong Custer issued a formal and official
defense of his disciplinary measures in Louisiana and Texas. In
his letter to Divisional Acting Adjutant General Major George
Lee, Custer declared flatly "that something beyond the ordinary
course of procedure was absolutely necessary if I desired to in-
sure order and good conduct in my command." The conduct of
the troops at Alexandria "was infamous, and rendered them a
terror to the inhabitants of that locality, and a disgrace to this or
any other service." Custer referred to "bands of soldiers," looting
the countryside and terrifying the population, and he accused
the adjutant of the First Iowa Cavalry of leading one of those
raids. The volunteer officers not only condoned, but partici-
pated in, these unlawful activities, he said, and they also sup-
ported their men's determination never, under any circum-
stances, to go to Mexico or even to occupy Texas.^ ^
28. Cogley, Indiana, 164; Thompson, "Autobiography," 63.
29. George Armstrong Custer to Major George Lee, Assistant Adjutant
General, Military Division of the Gulf, 25 Oct. 1865, in Adjutant General's Re-
port, 1867, 2: 527-30.
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Under these circumstances, the young general felt he had
no alternative but to take stringent disciplinary measures and to
eliminate volunteers as much as possible from their enforce-
ment, since a court-martial consisting of volunteer officers, he
insisted, would have been a "mere mockery." Separated from his
nearest superior by seven hundred miles of uncertain communi-
cation, Custer had to act on his own. Act he did, by issuing Spe-
cial Order No. 2. Upon Governor Stone's request and Major
Lee's command, he had withdrawn the order. Custer insisted
nevertheless that his action had served its purpose; it had im-
proved discipline in the troops under his command. "I have been
in almost continuous command of troops since the commence-
ment of the war," he said, and "I have never been in command of
troops whose conduct . . . so nearly resembled that of a mob."
But, he concluded, 'I am happy to say that to-day no better be-
haved regiments are included in the volunteer force than those
now composing my command."^''
At first glance, Custer's defense is convincing. There were
indeed difficulties in maintaining control over approximately
four thousand western individualists who did not understand
why they were needed in an army when there was no war. As
Colonel William Thompson noted, the Iowa soldiers were "vol-
unteers for a special purpose, not regular soldiers by profession,"
and they could not understand why they should "not have been
rewarded by the boon of having been released from further
service and sent home as a reward for previous good service."
Thompson observed that "a feeling arose and by diffusion be-
came quite common, that as good soldiering had produced such
disastrous results, good policy demanded that they adopt the
plan of acting as bad soldiers.'^i Independent men undoubtedly
pillaged livestock and grain from the fields of those who had
been mortal enemies a month or two earlier.
This sort of independent action obviously had to be con-
trolled. Unfortunately, the methods employed were so extreme
that they only compounded the difficulties. The strictures of
Special Order No. 2 were simply too severe for postwar foraging.
Head-shaving and lashes may or may not have been appropriate
30. Ibid.
31. Thompson, "Autobiography," 59.
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during war, but they were certainly unacceptable in peace. A
sensitive officer would have known that.
The issue of desertions, however, may be another matter.
According to Hoosier historian Cogley, "growing discontent
among the soldiers . .. led to numerous desertions, in fact, the
men deserted in squads and platoons." An Iowa soldier reported,
on the other hand, that "no desertions occurred in our Regiment
. . . until several days after the appearance of 'Special Order
number Two.'" Even in the Iowa regiment, however, there were
certainly instances of temporary absences without leave. One
soldier frankly wrote home from Austin that "I tried to get per-
mission" to go to town, "but could not. guess I shall go in the
morning without it."^ ^
Even Thomas Cogley, a severe critic of Custer's treatment of
the Second Cavalry Division, admitted that desertion "cannot be
excused, and, in time of active war, [deserters] should have suf-
fered death," but he contended that "there is a vast difference in
desertion in the face of an enemy, and desertion after a war is
over." It is dangerous to argue that military regulations should be
enforced in war and ignored in peace. On the other hand. Gen-
eral Custer himself apparently violated an important procedural
regulation when he ordered the execution of at least one de-
serter in Louisiana without securing the president's approval.''^
Regardless of the seriousness of the crime, a commander has no
right to ignore one regulation to enforce another.
Other troubling questions about Custer's assessments of
the condition of his troops remain. Adjutant Morrill of the Eirst
Iowa Cavalry noted, "it is quite remarkable how a Regt so highly
praised in Inspection Reports from March to September (by offi-
cers over whom Gen. Custer had no control) should be so sadly
demoralized 'the day after joining Custer's command.'" He also
asserted that all "special inspectors of Cavalry" disagreed with
the commanding general's evaluation of the condition of his
troops. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel McQueen insisted that the
court-martial over which he presided after July 1865 was not a
"mere mockery," as Custer had charged. In fact, according to
both the regimental commander and his adjutant, Custer had
32. Cogley, Indiana, 164; Morrill to Kirkwood, 23 Ian. 1867, Kirkwood
Papers; Lodge to Mother, 6 Nov. 1865, Lodge Collection.
33. Cogley, Indiana, 166-67.
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complimented the court for both the quality and quantity of its
work before leaving Alexandria for Texas.^ ^
Unfortunately for historians, none of the inspections or
special orders can be located today in the military records of the
National Archives. Perhaps, as John Carroll argues, they never
existed, and the embittered officers were fabricating support
for their vicious charges. In two specific instances, however,
the documents support the Iowans to the discredit of their divi-
sional commander.
First, in Custer's letter he charged Major Morrill with un-
dertaking an unauthorized "robbing" expedition. There is, how-
ever, no record anywhere of any such charge against Morrill, nor
is there any order for his arrest. General Custer had, in fact, ap-
pointed Morrill to the court-martial on October 13,1865, almost
two weeks before he mailed his self-defense to Major Lee. Why
would he appoint a man to such a position who was guilty of a
serious breach of conduct? The evidence suggests instead that
Custer made the charge against Morrill in desperation.^'
General Order No. 5, issued on September 14 in Hemp-
stead, is just as damaging to Custer's defense, and even more
confusing. In that order the general congratulated the Second
Brigade, of which the First Iowa was a part, as a unit that was "so
strictly honest and upright as to afford a Shining Example to
other portions of this Command." Yet on the same day he or-
dered two men from that same brigade, one from the First Iowa,
arrested, their heads shaved, and lashes inflicted. Apparently on
September 14 Custer did not think that one incident involving
relatively few men reflected on an entire regiment—or on his
total command. By the time he wrote his October defense, how-
ever, he had changed his mind. In the absence of documentation
to the contrary, one must conclude that Custer misrepresented
conditions and ignored his own actions in order to defend him-
self against the attacks of aroused state officials.^ ^
However one resolves the accusations related to these par-
ticular incidents, though, there is one point that stands alone as
34. Morrill to Kirkwood, 23 Jan. 1867, McQueen to Kirkwood, 19 Jan.
1867, Kirkwood Papers.
35. Ibid.
36. General Order No. 5, 14 Sept. 1865, Order Book, 1st Iowa Cavalry,
RG94, 2d sec, p. 57, National Archives.
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incontrovertible, inexcusable, and illegal. That is Special Order
No. 2 itself. Neither Adjutant General Baker nor Governor
Stone ever received a direct reply from the War Department on
the legality of the order. Finally, however, on January 7, 1867,
nearly fifteen months after Hawkeye Governor Stone had first
written to the War Department, E. D. Townsend, assistant adju-
tant general in Washington, did respond to an inquiry from Sen-
ator Samuel Jordan Kirkwood. According to Townsend, "no offi-
cial copy of the order referred to has been received by this
Department." Townsend did report, however, that "Section 3, of
an 'Act making appropriations for fortifications and for other
purposes,' approved August 5, 1861, enacts 'that flogging as
punishment in the army is hereby abolished.'" On the other
hand, he stated, there was "no regulation or law prohibiting the
shaving of the head . . . , and for many years past it has some-
times in aggravated cases been a part of sentences awarded by
Courts Martial."37
In this, then, the facts are clear. Custer ordered lashes and
inflicted punishment without allowing the accused access to a
court-martial; and if lashing did not violate the letter of the law
against flogging, it certainly violated the spirit. Therefore, in is-
suing and enforcing Special Order No. 2, a major general in the
United States Army violated federal law, just as he ignored the
Articles of War when he put a deserter to death without presi-
dential review. Even if all the other charges made by the volun-
teer soldiers were to be put aside as personal, vindictive, and
petty—which some, but not all, of them were—General Custer
must still stand guilty of enforcing unwarranted, unauthorized,
and illegal disciplinary measures. This would have been bad
enough during war. In peace it was nothing short of criminal.
QUITE ASIDE FROM THE ACCURACY OF THE CHARGES,
however, it is highly significant that an army officer, a major
general of volunteers, should have to answer to the charges of a
state official. Nor did Custer's defense have any effect in quell-
ing the storm gathering over the prairie. Instead, it was used as
the starting point of new attacks and an eventual wave of resent-
37. E. D. Townsend to Kirkwood, 7 Jan. 1867, Kirkwood Papers.
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ment that resulted in official action by the state legislature
against a federal military officer.
When faced with "unnecessary suffering," unacceptable
discipline, and what was believed to be an unnecessary exten-
sion of service, the troops of the First Iowa Cavalry did what
they had done throughout the war They wrote home. Iowa offi-
cials responded with vigor and influence to protect their
Hawkeye heroes from the vagaries of federal authority. At first
the governor and state adjutant general demanded that the
troops be mustered out and returned to the state. When that
could not be accomplished, they sought retribution against the
man who had humiliated the native sons. Returning veterans
marshalled a concerted effort among home-state politicians to
remove George Armstrong Custer from command.^*
It is not clear who first complained to Governor Stone, and
Kirkwood apparently became involved only after Stone's efforts
to intercede failed. But there is no question that, once informed,
these two public officials requested written testimony from their
soldier constituents. The letters sent to public officials like
Kirkwood and Stone reflected a consistency that should not be
surprising. These soldiers had served together Often they had
grown up together. One should expect them to corroborate each
others' stories.
Yet the effort to hold General Custer responsible for the
conditions under which his troops served was not organized in
the sense of a modern political cause or issue campaign. It did
not need to be. The anti-Custer movement in Iowa was led by a
few officers from the regiment involved. Since it was nearly im-
possible to become an officer of Iowa volunteers without being
an active member of the state's Republican party, many officers
maintained important political connections that they were not
hesitant to use directly and vigorously. The efforts of men like
Morrill, Lothrop, and McQueen were assisted by exuberant state
chauvinism. Politics played another role when Iowa's over-
whelmingly Republican legislature inevitably became involved
and ultimately decided to pillory one of the nation's most popu-
lar Democratic generals.
38. Morrill to Kirkwood, 23 Jan. 1867, Kirkwood Papers; Stone to
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On April 2,1866, only two months after the First Iowa Cav-
alry was mustered out of the service and two weeks after it had
returned to Davenport, the Iowa State House of Representatives
passed a resolution officially condemning Ceneral Ceorge
Armstrong Custer, a federal military officer, "to condign punish-
ment, that future tyrants may take warning from the example."
A special committee had been created to review the evidence, al-
though the objectivity of its members might be questioned. Un-
fortunately, the records of that committee have not survived, but
it apparently reviewed special inspection reports and federal
laws and regulations. Perhaps most important, the troops were
home, and their testimony was vigorous on their own behalf.
After reviewing the (naturally) proud history of the regiment, its
general suffering under Custer, and previous official state ef-
forts to rectify the unacceptable situation, the committee con-
cluded that the First Iowa Cavalry had "received from the hands
of Major-Ceneral Custer . .. such ill treatment as no other Iowa
soldiers have ever been called upon to endure; that such treat-
ment or punishment was dishonorable to the General inflicting
it, degrading to the name of American soldier, unworthy of the
cause in which they were engaged, and in direct and flagrant
violation of the laws, of Congress and the rules and articles of
The committee report appropriately concentrated on the
illegality of Special Order No. 2 and its enforcement. The final
resolution referred to the congressional ban on "the barbarous
and inhuman punishment of flogging," cited Special Order
No. 2 and its administration in direct contradiction to that law,
and concluded
That, while we recognize the necessity of strict enforcement of
military discipline, and the propriety of punishing every violation
thereof in such a manner as the laws of Congress and Articles of
War may direct, we also consider that the infliction of the cruel
and barbarous punishment referred to could only have a ten-
dency to render soldiers discontented and insubordinate, and
Stanton, 18 Oct. 1865, Baker to Stanton, 7 Oct. 1865, Adjutant General's
Office.
39. Journal of the House of Representatives of the Eleventh General Assem-
bly of the State of Iowa (Des Moines, 1866), 752-56; Lothrop, History, 233-37.
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that by this wanton and atrocious outrage, the majesty of the law
has been condemned, the honor of the State has been insulted,
and the rights of American soldiers trampled under foot, and we
demand that the author thereof be held to strict accountability.'"'
This was the ultimate action the state could take—a direct,
official legislative demand for federal intervention for the wel-
fare of what, after four years of war, were still perceived as state
troops. But it was too late. Custer had already been mustered out
of the army in February with his command. The War Depart-
ment apparently was not anxious to retain the services of such a
controversial and headstrong young game cock.
Custer was not to be denied, however. He immediately set
his political benefactors to work to secure him another appoint-
ment, and not just any appointment. He wanted nothing less
than a major general's stripes in the regular army, which would
have constituted a considerable promotion over his Civil War
position, especially at his tender age. The impetuous hero had
earned too many enemies to achieve his goal, however. His ene-
mies included both senators from Iowa, who possessed two
votes and the right to participate in debate on the appointment
of any general officer. In January and February 1867 Senator
Kirkwood fought hard to prevent the Hawkeye nemesis from re-
turning to the service. Custer's new appointment in 1867 was
both a victory and a defeat for each side. On one hand, Custer
returned to command; on the other, the position (and pay) of
lieutenant colonel of the newly created Seventh Cavalry was far
below what Custer had requested and felt he deserved."*^
For decades afterwards, the collective memory of the for-
mer regiment remained embittered by the nightmare of service
under Custer in Texas, and the veterans toiled diligently to ex-
punge their record of this particularly unpleasant episode.""^ But
the importance of the history of the First Iowa Cavalry is in the
struggle between state and federal authorities for the control of
volunteer troops. From stormy initiation under Fitz Henry War-
40. House Journal, 1866, 752-56.
41. Monaghan, Cwsier, 267-79.
42. Proceedings of the First Reunion of the First Iowa Cavalry (Davenport,
1884), 31-32; Proceedings of the Second Reunion of the First Iowa Veteran Volun-
teer Cavalry (Cedar Rapids, 1886), 83-84.
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ren to unsatisfactory valedictory under George Armstrong
Custer, the history of the First Iowa Cavalry provides a case
study in the evolution of federalism, that uniquely American
form of governing that allows different levels of government to
overlap and compete with each other for legal authority, institu-
tional legitimacy, and personal loyalty.
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